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Introduction
Copyright law has always been a response to technological
change. In fact, the purpose of copyright law is to promote
technological change or innovation. Congress and the judiciary have
pursued this policy goal by maintaining a delicate balance between
incentives for innovators and access for the public. As a result of new
innovation in digital technology,' however, copyright law is currently
experiencing growing pains.
The purpose of this article is to describe the delicate balance of
copyright policy and demonstrate how modern trends, coupled with
congressional action, threaten that balance. More specifically, this
paper seeks to demonstrate that the anti-circumvention provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act2 (DMCA) threaten to
undermine the economic justification of copyright law.
For better or worse, courts and scholars have adopted the social
science of modern economics as the preferred way to analyze how
intellectual property laws affect innovation. This approach recognizes
that copyright law, more than many other types of legislation,
intervenes in the natural state of the market place.3 The breeding
ground for innovation begins in a state of market failure because
intangible knowledge and expression are public goods incapable of
exclusion. Copyright law intervenes in the market place for
innovation by creating an incentive to pursue activities that result in
innovation. The incentive is a limited legal monopoly otherwise
known as a copyright. Copyright law is used to exclude certain uses of
another's expression. Because copyright law intervenes in the market
place, enacting copyright law requires extreme caution to avoid
upsetting the market in ways that obliterate competition and stymie

1. This paper is concerned with copyrights in digital technology. This includes
software and other forms of digital technology, such as the firmware most often associated
with dedicated systems. When the term "industry" is used, it is in reference to all
industries involved in the market for digital technology.
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304,112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
3. It might be argued that copyright law does not intervene in the market place, but
rather creates or facilitates the market place. Cf BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
(Antitrust cases where horizontal agreements effecting trade were given rule of reason
treatment, rather than being deemed per se illegal because the agreements were viewed as
facilitating the creation of a market). This position, however, begs the question by
assuming the beneficial result of enacting copyright law. The better approach is to view
copyright law as an intervention, which, if executed properly, facilitates the market place
by correcting a market failure.
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innovation. Managing the complex relationship between incentives
for innovation and public access to new technologies requires
discretion and foresight. Nevertheless, Congress has been swift and
imprudent in response to changing technologies. The DMCA anticircumvention measures fundamentally change copyright law in a way
that is sure to crush innovation.
Part I of this Comment describes the historical balance struck by
copyright law between incentives for authors and access to creative
works. Part II explains how this balance is threatened by various
modern trends, culminating in the enactment of the DMCA. Part III
argues that the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA hinder
innovation and are unconstitutional. Part IV concludes that
regardless of the constitutionality of this act, the anti-circumvention
measures are poor public policy because they thwart competition and
innovation in an otherwise expanding technological marketplace.
I
The Balancing Act of Copyright Policy
The Constitutional basis for, and limits of,4 the Copyright law are
found in Article I, Section 8, clause 8, which provides: "The Congress
shall have Power.. .To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
This grant of power, found within the Enumerated Powers clause
of the United States Constitution, is unique because it expressly
provides a policy purpose The only purpose for which limited
monopolies may be granted is to promote the progress of innovation.6

4.

The Copyright and Patent clause differs significantly from other clauses within

Article I, Section 8; most clauses do not contain express limitations or limiting purposes.
Furthermore, the traditional construction given to the limiting language of the Copyright

and Patent clause is different than the treatment given to the apparently limiting language
in the Necessary and Proper clause, also found within Article I, Section 8. In McCulloch v.

Maryland, the Supreme Court applied a structuralist approach that stripped the term
"necessary" of meaning by holding that Article I, Section 8 contains only grants of power,
not limits of power. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The language of the Copyright and Patent clause,

however, has been given different treatment by the Supreme Court and virtually all
commentators. See James D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That is the Software Copyright

Question, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 251, 255 (1997) (noting that the grant of power in the
Copyright and Patent clause is unusual in that drafters included a limiting purpose). For a
full treatment of the Enumerated Powers clause see also William Patry, The Enumerated
Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67

George Wash. L. Rev. 359 (1999).
5.
6.

See White, supra n. 4.
Patry, supra n. 4, at 362 and 381 (arguing that Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
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Justice Stevens explained in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.7
This constitutionally mandated policy goal has often been
described as a delicate balance between the rights granted to
copyright owners and the rights of the public.' The risk in underprotecting the rights granted to copyright holders is the possibility
that the incentive mechanism will be eroded, resulting in a loss of
creative innovation. Overprotecting the rights granted to copyright
holders creates the risk inherent in monopolies; monopoly power will
impede competition and creative innovation.
When drafting the Copyright and Patent clause, the framers were
well aware of the dangers of English monopolies.9 They also realized
that the "sciences" and "arts" are susceptible to piracy and in need of
protection. In other words, knowledge and learning are public goods
prone to free-riding by others and incapable of exclusion without the
force of law. ° The Copyright & Patent clause is a response to the
problem of piracy. Today, we describe piracy and monopolies in
contains both positive and negative rights, and characterizing the clause as "bimodal"
because it balances the positive rights in the authors and the negative rights in the public).
7. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
8. White, supra n. 4, at 264 (balance between the rights granted to creators and
those retained by the public); Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification,
Criminalization:Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the
Willfulness Requirement, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 835, 836 (1999) (balance between rights
granted to copyright owners and the rights granted to the users of copyrighted material);
J.H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 793,
800 (1999) (balance between public and private interests); Brian A. Carlson, Balancing the
Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50 SMU L. Rev. 825, 826 (1997) (balance between the
incentive of authors to create against society's interest in the unhindered dissemination of
ideas); Anthony J. Mahajan, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering
After ProCd:A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3297,
3299 n.17 (1999) (noting the Supreme Courts observation of the constitutional objective of
striking a balance).
9. White supra n. 4, at 255; Patry supra n. 4, at 370.
10. Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: the New Economic Orthodoxy of 'Rights
Management" 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 471(1998) (deconstructing the rhetoric of economic
efficiency by comparing Chicago-school analysis to the analysis in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
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terms of market failures, and we use economic language to justify
copyright law."

II
The Delicate Balance is Threatened
A.

Industry Trends

Several modern trends threaten to upset the balance of copyright
policy. Intellectual property law, private contract, and technological
innovation have mitigated, if not extinguished, the threat of market
failure by way of free-riding. However, efforts to combat free-riding
have induced another market failure. Unlimited, de facto monopolies
in intangible information and ideas are being created.
First, Congress opted to extend copyright protection to cover
computer programs as literary works. 2 It is clear that Congress
created a quandary regarding the appropriate scope of protection to
afford software. 3 The Copyright Act expressly prohibits the
protection of any idea, procedure, process, system, or method of
operation, yet mandates that computer programs are appropriate
subject matter for protection. 4 Computer programs are essentially
processes or methods of operation and are primarily valued for their
functional aspects. Nevertheless, copyright protection has been
extended over the source code and object code of applications and
operating systems.'5 The decision to extend copyright protection to
computer programs upsets the balance of copyright policy in a way
that is not fully appreciable until viewed in the context of the

11. Id. at 471 n.25 (explaining that the term 'market failure' refers to situations where
market transactions do not achieve the most efficient, socially optimal allocation of
resources and includes free-riding, monopolies, externalities, and information
asymmetries).

12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
13. See Andrew R. Jaglom, Computer Related Distribution Issues: Current
Developments in On-line, Copyright Protection, Software Distribution, and Licensing,

SD62 ALI-ABA 679, 694 (1999) (describing the question of appropriate scope of
protection for software as an "unsettled morass of conflicting Court of Appeals
decisions"). The related issues of whether to pursue alternative approaches to protecting
computer programs, such as using patent law or a sui generis approach, is beyond the
scope of this comment.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), § 101 (2000), respectively.
15. Stephen J. Davidson, Nicole A. Engisch, and James S., Woodward, Software
Copyright and Competition, 566 PLI/Pat 205, 212 (1999) (citing Stern Electronics, Inc. v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)).
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industry's prevalent use of private contracts and technological
safeguards.
The second trend placing pressure on the balance of copyright
policy is the prevalent use of "click-through" contracts by the
copyright industry. These "click-through" agreements are nonnegotiable adhesion contracts designed to protect the interests of
copyright owners by restricting various uses of their works. "Clickthrough" licenses routinely require users to refrain from various
activities which would otherwise be allowed as a fair use, such as
reverse engineering, parody, or criticism. The use of "click-through"
contracts has become a wide spread industry practice.16 Moreover,
this practice has been legitimized by Judge Easterbrook's decision in
7 ProCD and its progeny hold that these
ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg."
agreements are generally enforceable."' The use of "click-through"
contracts may be a result of modern business realities, but it also
affects the balance of copyright law. The use of "click-through"
contracts is particularly troubling when used in conjunction with
technological protection measures.
The third trend is the advent of technological protection
measures which are also known as trusted systems, lock-out systems,
rights management systems, and copyright management systems
(CMS). 9 Technological protection measures come in various shapes
and sizes. Digital envelopes, time-bombs, self-reporting software,
encryption devices, watermarks and spiders are just a few examples of
technological innovations currently used to regulate the access and
use of digital works. Like the use of "click-through" licenses,
technological protection systems are designed to protect the interests
of copyright owners by preventing various uses of their works.
Technological safeguards can be effectively used by the industry to
prevent uses that are statutorily privileged. Professor Julie Cohen
explains:

16. Michael Madison, Legal-ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1025, 1053 (1998).
17. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
18. "Shrink-wrap" and "click-through" contracts are enforceable, not withstanding
invalidation for public policy reasons, if notice is provided and an opportunity to return
the product is given. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997);
M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 93 Wash. App. 819 (Wash. App. 1999);
Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. Dharma Systems, Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).

19. Throughout this comment, I use these terms interchangeably. For an excellent
description of trusted systems see Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems
and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink DigitalPublishing,12 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 137 (1997).
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Ultimately, digital CMS will allow content owners to insist on
greater protection than copyright law would afford . . . [F]or
example, by requiring payment for any excerpting of a digital work
regardless of the reader's purpose, or by conditioning access to the
work on acceptance of a contractual provision prohibiting parodies
. . . copyright owners will be able to implement contractual
restrictions prohibiting reuse of the ideas, facts, or functional
principles contained in a work ... or prohibiting reuse of formerly
copyrighted expression that has fallen into the public domain.2"

These technologies used in combination with "click-through"
licenses, if unchecked, will result in de facto monopolies over that
which belongs in the public domain.2
B.

The Judicial Response

The congressional decision to protect computer programs by
copyright law, coupled with industry practice of using "click-through"
adhesion contracts and technological protection measures, results in
inefficient markets. The courts have responded to this changing
balance in copyright law by using equitable doctrines.
1.

Fair Use

The doctrine of fair use permits uses of works that are beneficial
to the public and ensures public access to works by combating
overreaching practices by the industry.2 Industry overreaching occurs
when the industry attempts to control markets that they are not
entitled to control. Private adhesion contracts, digital protection
measures, and enforcement actions are the primary means by which
the industry overreaches. Overreaching copyright owners seek to
prevent competitors from reverse engineering their product, that is
prevent them from engaging in the "process of starting with a finished
product and working backwards to analyze how the product operates

20. Cohen, supra n. 10, at 472-73.
21. For a robust conceptualization of the public domain, see Yochai Benkler, Free as
the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain,
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999). See also Madison, supra n. 16, at 1092-1107 (arguing that the
public domain is a doctrinal representation of "open space" and further noting that
despite the implicit existence of a public domain in the copyright statute and the
Constitution, there is lack of express statutory or constitutional support for the concept of
the public domain).
22. Traditionally, the focus has been on the defendant's activities, but as Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. indicates, it is extremely easy for courts to justify a
finding of fair use by denouncing the plaintiff's abhorrent activities. 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24
(1992).
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or how it was made., 23 Copyright owners are concerned with reverse
engineering because it can result in the development of competing
products.
• 21Reverse engineering of software code requires intermediate

copying. Copyright owners who desire to restrict competition claim
that those intermediate copies constitute infringement. 2 By
acknowledging

that reverse engineering, including intermediate

copying, can constitute a fair use activity, the courts create the
possibility of market entry.
Fair use is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright
infringement codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107.26
The statute requires courts to balance four factors in the
determination of whether a defendant's activities constitute a fair
use. 27 A court conducting a fair use analysis must consider (1) the

purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the work, (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in proportion to the
copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."
The first sentence of §107, sometimes inaccurately termed the
'preamble," provides a list of activities that are typically considered
fair uses. The list includes criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research.2 ' Although this list does not

include reverse engineering, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.

23. Secure Services Technology, Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp.
1354, 1361 n. 16 (E.D. Va. 1989).
24. For an explanation of the process of decompiling and reverse engineering of
software, see generally Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real
World, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 843 (1994).
25. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510.
26. The origins of fair use are often traced back to Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342
(1841). Fair use enjoyed years of equitable evolution until it was frozen by codification in
1976. The doctrine has further been restrained by the efforts of President Clinton's
Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) and general international hostility. See U.S.
Dep't of Commerce Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights (1995), better known as the White Paper. In 1982, Wendy Gordon
published an article arguing that fair use was best viewed as a remedy for market failures.
Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982). This argument has
since achieved a prominent position. The alternative to this position acknowledges both
market and non-market policy concerns when conducting a fair use analysis. This latter
position views copyright law as an "incomplete commodification" regime. See Cohen,
supra n. 10, at 493.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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makes clear that reverse engineering, under certain circumstances, is
now considered a fair use activity.3"
In Sega, the Ninth Circuit invoked the equitable doctrine of fair
use in response to (1) the challenge of determining the appropriate
scope of protection to be afforded computer software and (2) the
industry trend of using technological protection measures." The
plaintiff, Sega, held a copyright in the Genesis console, a platform
used for running video game applications.32 Sega was in the business
of selling consoles and various games; it was also in the business of
licensing the right to make games for the console to willing third
parties.33 In order to prevent unauthorized competitors from building
their own compatible games, Sega used a technological "lock-out"
measure. ' The defendant, Accolade, reverse engineered the console,
making intermediate copies of the console in the process.3" Sega sued
for copyright infringement,36 but the court held that reverse
engineering is a fair use when it is necessary to gain access to
unprotectable, functional elements.3 7
The court's holding in Sega is shaped by copyright policy focused
on public interests. The court wrote:
In determining whether a challenged use of a copyrighted material
is fair, a court must keep in mind the public policy underlying the
Copyright Act. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an author's labor. But the ultimate aim is...
to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. When
technological change has rendered an aspect ... of the Copyright
Act ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of
this basic purpose . . . [T~he fact that computer programs are
distributed for public use in object code form often precludes public
access to ideas and functional concepts contained in those
programs, and thus confers on the copyright owner a de facto
monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts. That
result
defeats the fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act .... 38
The court pursued the public policy underlying copyright law by

30. 977 F.2d at 1527-1528 (holding that making copies of protected works for the
purposes of reverse-engineering is a fair use when there is no other means of gaining
access to the functional aspects of the underlying work). See also supra n. 22.
31. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519-20, 1524.
32. Id. at 1514.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1515.
35. Id.
36. In Sega, the court also rejected a claim of trademark infringement and false
designation of origin. Id. at 1514
37. Id. at 1527-1528.
38. Id. at 1527.
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conducting a fair use inquiry and finding that Accolade's act of
reverse engineering constituted a fair use. The court's treatment of
the fair use factors is of particular interest. When analyzing the first
factor, the purpose and character of Accolades' use, the court noted
that Accolade's objective was not simple piracy, but rather
achievement of program compatibility.39 The court further noted that
the "public benefit" resulting from this use was the "growth in
creative expression, based on the dissemination of other creative
works and the unprotected ideas contained in those works... ,40
When analyzing the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the
market, the court noted the difference between market usurpation
and mere entry into the market.4' The court also distinguished
between the market for the console and the market for the games,
and noted that Accolade's games did not infringe Sega's copyright in
the console. 42 The court then turned to Sega's culpable behavior in
overreaching; the court concluded that, "an attempt to monopolize
the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs
counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative
expression ....4'The fair use analysis conducted by the court was

basically market analysis; the court's goal was to preserve competition
and innovation." By invoking the fair use doctrine, the court
prevented Sega from excluding competitors from a market in which it
held no exclusive rights, i.e. the market for game applications.45
The analysis in Sega comes full circle in Sony Computer
Entertainment Inc., v. Connectix Corp., a recent case dealing with

similar issues. 46 Like Sega, Sony was in the business of selling consoles
and various games; Sony was also in the business of licensing the right

39. Id. at 1522.
40. Id. at 1523.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1523-1524.
44. It is interesting to note that the court could have applied a copyright misuse
analysis in this case. Of course, in 1992, the doctrine of copyright misuse was not yet
robust. See Karen E. Georgenson, Reverse Engineeringof Copyrighted Software: Fair Use
or Misuse?, 5 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 291 (1996) (arguing that courts like the Sega court
distort the statutory guidelines of §107 by applying fair use, when misuse could be used to
pursue the appropriate policy analysis); White, supra n. 4 (arguing that misuse is the best
way to retain the balance of copyright law when the creators of a class of works, e.g.
computer programs, gain excessive power).
45. Clearly, copyright law does not grant Sega the right to mandate what games the
public can choose to play, by virtue of a copyright in a console.
46. 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
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to make games for the console to willing third parties. 7 Connectix
reverse engineered a Sony console and developed emulator software
that allowed Sony's games to be played on personal computers, rather
than Sony's console. 8 Sony sued Connectix for copyright
infringement. The court held for Connectix, relying primarily on the
Sega decision.49
Of primary interest in assessing these two cases is the manner in
which the fair use analysis is applied. The only notable difference
between Sega and Connectix is the way in which the courts define
relevant markets while conducting the inquiry into the effect of the
use on the market. In Sega, the relevant market was the market for
platforms; Accolade was only making game applications that were
compatible with Sega's platform. In Connectix, the relevant market
was the market for game applications; Connectix only produced a
platform that was compatible with Sony's game applications. After
the Connectix decision, it does not matter how the relevant markets
are parsed, the issue is whether the defendant was reverse
engineering to build a compatible, non-infringing product. For the
court in Connectix, the issue was access for the sake of market
competition and, presumably, innovation.0 Fair use has been a useful
tool in combating the industry's overreaching, which might otherwise
result in the establishment of de facto monopolies beyond the original
grant of the copyright.
2.

Copyright Misuse

Whereas fair use is a venerable doctrine, copyright misuse is a
relatively new concept. In fact, copyright misuse is a direct response
to the decision to extend copyright protection to computer
programs." With computer programs, the risk that copyright owners
will pursue business practices with exclusionary tendencies is more
prevalent than with other subject matter. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth
writes:

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 598.
Id. at 598-99.
Id.
Id. at 602-03.
See J.H. Reichman, Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual

Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information,

147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875, 923 (1999); Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for
Functional Copyright Misuse Standards,46 Stan. L. Rev. 401,409 (1994).
52. See Mark Gimbel, Some Thoughts on the Implications of Trusted Systems for
IntellectualPropertyLaw, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1671, 1674-75 (1998) (arguing that digital works

12

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[23:1

With the penetration of copyrightable software into every aspect of
our lives, from grocery stores to product design and manufacture,
digital answering machines.. .and obviously, the ubiquitous
personal computer, the potential for the copyright to confer
monopoly power has increased logarithmically. The dramatic
increase in the use of copyright misuse
defense in the realm of
53
software illustrates this phenomenon.
Like the doctrine of fair use, the doctrine of copyright misuse
helps courts police anti-competitive, and presumably anti-innovative
practices by copyright owners.
In 1990, the Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds, became the first court to expressly recognize the defense of
copyright misuse." In Lasercomb, the plaintiff developed and
marketed a copyrighted software program.5 The license agreement
prohibited the licensee from developing its own competing software.
Additionally, the term of the agreement was for 99 years, which
extends beyond the lifetime of the copyright.56 The plaintiff protected
its software from unauthorized access by using a technological
protection device. 7 The defendant did not agree to the license terms,
but rather circumvented the technological protection device. The
defendant then made infringing copies of the software and proceeded
to market its own infringing version of the software. 8
Analogizing from patent misuse, the court recognized the
existence of copyright misuse as a defense, and found for the
defendant. 9 The court held that although the defendant had not
agreed to the terms of the license, the license agreement had an
adverse effect on the public interest in contravention of the policy of
copyright law." The court in Lasercomb used the doctrine of
copyright misuse to conduct a market analysis by asking the question:
did the plaintiff's conduct have an anti-competitive effect on the

are more susceptible to control because they are indecipherable without the aid of a
computer and can be encrypted and policed by trusted systems).
53. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual
PropertyMonopoly, 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 32 (1998).
54. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
55. Id. at 971.
56. Id. at 972-73.
57. Id. at 971.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 976, 979. This analogy is fairly strong considering that the constitutional
justification and purpose for patent law and copyright is the same: Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8.
60. Id. at 978.
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market outside the protection of the copyright? 6' The court thus used

copyright misuse as a means of responding to the need to define the
appropriate scope of protection for software and the need to limit the
use of abusive private contracts and technological measures to
exclude competitors.
Shortly after Lasercomb, courts all over the United States began
to rely on the doctrine of copyright misuse. 62 Although the viability of

the copyright misuse doctrine is now widely accepted by the legal
community, the scope of the defense is still debatable.63 This is not
nearly as problematic as many commentators would suggest; the
scope of fair use was at issue even after codification in 1976.
Copyright misuse will eventually become a venerable doctrine, much
like its counterpart, fair use.
Despite the fact that the copyright misuse doctrine is in flux,
there are some elements of copyright misuse that are well settled.
First, copyright misuse is only a defense; it has never been recognized
as a cause of action. ' Second, copyright misuse does not invalidate
the copyright; it only bars enforcement until the misuse has been
purged.6 ' Third, although a contract can be and often is the manner in
which copyright misuse occurs, copyright misuse is not a defense to
breach of contract.66 Finally, Lasercomb and commentators make

clear that copyright misuse does not require an antitrust violation.67 In
Lasercomb, the court wrote:
61. Id. This inquiry is not unlike the inquiry required by the fourth factor of a fair use
analysis.
62. See, e.g., DSC Commun. Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir.
1996); Prac. Mgt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Qad v. ALN, 770 F.
Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991). See also Fellmeth, supra n. 53, at 21 (noting that the Supreme
Court has referred to the possibility of using the copyright misuse defense, but has not
expressly validated the existence of the defense and noting that most circuits recognize the
copyright misuse defense).
63. Fellmeth, supra n. 53, at 5, 11.
64. Id. at 11 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Ent. Servs., 746 F.
Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
65. Claude M. Stern, License Termination and Copyright Misuse, 510 PLI/Pat 151,
163 (1998).
66. See Fellmeth, supra n. 53, at 10-11; however, a court may choose not to enforce
these contracts as unconscionable or void for public policy. For an excellent discussion
regarding the use of unconscionability, preemption, copyright misuse, and federal and
state public policy to void contracts, see Mark Lemely, Beyond Preemption: The Law and
Policy of IntellectualProperty Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999).
67. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978; Prac. Mgt. Info. Corp, 121 F.3d at 521; Fellmeth,
supra n. 53, at 36-37 (arguing that courts should engage in copyright misuse analysis in
order to consider copyright policy before engaging in a distinctly separate antitrust
analysis); Georgenson, supra n. 44, at 317-18 (presenting a hypothetical that demonstrates
a scenario in which a plaintiff's actions run counter to copyright's policy regarding
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So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate

antirust law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright
defense, the converse is not necessarily true-a misuse need not be
a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable
defense to an infringement action. The question is not whether the
copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law ... but
whether the copyright is being used in a manner61violative of the
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.
The distinction between antitrust analysis and copyright misuse
may be a subtle distinction, but it is also an important distinction.
Antitrust laws are designed to protect competition while copyright
laws are designed to promote innovation. The key difference is
between competition and innovation; competition and innovation do
not necessarily go hand-in-hand.
Competition is often used in copyright case law as a proxy for
innovation.69 Courts and commentators use competition as a proxy
because it is a useful concept. First, it is easier to analyze the effect of
an activity on competition than it is to analyze the effect of an activity
on innovation. Secondly, there is some relation between competition
and innovation. Competition is a catalyst for, but not sufficient for,
innovation. Where there is competition, often there is also
innovation. Where there is no competition, innovation is stagnant.
The doctrine of copyright misuse may still be developing, but it is
nonetheless an important tool available to combat anti-innovative
behavior. Fair use has also been available to protect would-be
innovators from infringement claims. Under either doctrine,
copyright's constitutional policy is pursued and the delicate balance
of copyright may be maintained or restored. Unfortunately, these
equitable mechanisms have been made unavailable by a new and
unwise law-the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.

innovation, but does not constitute an antitrust violation); Hanna, supra n. 51, at 445
("antitrust law is uniquely ill-suited to assess the impact of competitive practices in market
driven innovation").
68. 911 F.2d at 978.
69. See generally, Hanna, supra n. 51, at 424-425 (unlinking the relationship between
competition and innovation). Hanna's position is well made, even though her conclusion is
too extreme.
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III
The DMCA is Anti-innovation and Unconstitutional
A.

Industry Hopes and Fears Spawned a Legislative Monster

Professor Yochai Benkler pointed out that the copyright industry
actively sought the enactment of the DMCA anti-circumvention
measures because of its hopes for and fears of digital technology.7"
The industry's fear was that the ease with which digital works can be
copied and distributed would enable piracy. The industry's hope was
that the same technology could be used to establish an unavoidable
tollbooth at every use of the work." This certainly describes
Hollywood's support for the DMCA; Hollywood wants to prevent online piracy of its movies in digital formats. Furthermore, Hollywood
wants to control both the market for movies in digital formats and the
manner in which the movies are viewed. Congress was also motivated
by its own hopes for and fears of digital technology when it enacted
the DMCA.73 The legislative history indicates that Congress was also
fearful of international piracy. 4 Congress thus actualized the
industry's hopes when it enacted the DMCA."
The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 of the DMCA
generally prohibit two kinds of activities: (1) circumventing a
technological measure that controls access to a copyrighted work and
(2) manufacturing, importing, providing, or trafficking in

70. See Benkler, supra n. 21, at 422.
71. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 521, 533534 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA reflects Hollywood's preferences to the detriment of
the public).
72. See id.
73. The history of the birth of the DMCA is rather long and convoluted. The IITF's
'white paper' proposal began the process. After the bill reflecting the proposal was
successfully opposed in Congress, President Clinton and the U.S. Trade Representative
pushed their anti-circumvention policy as a treaty provision that became known as the
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty. Shortly after that, the anticircumvention provisions were introduced to Congress as part of the DMCA and sold on
the premise that their enactment was required to meet treaty obligations. See generally,
Samuelson, supra n. 72, at 521-522, 530-531.
74. 144 Cong. Rec. H7099 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Berman); 144
Cong. Rec. S4884 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 144 Cong. Rec.
S4887 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
75. See Samuelson supran. 72, at 522 ("With the enactment of the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA, the Administration may have had more success in achieving
imbalance in digital copyright law than Congress may have realized.").
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circumvention devices. 6 Specifically, § 1201(a)(1) provides that "no
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title."77 Section
1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) are anti-device provisions." Section 1201(a)(2)
targets devices that circumvent technical measures that control access,
while § 1201(b)(1) targets devices that circumvent technical measures
that protect the rights of a copyright owner. The DMCA anticircumvention provisions create express rights that are only indirectly
tied to copyrights;79 an underlying copyright infringement is not
required to make a § 1201 claim." The creation of new rights and
duties like this can have a major effect on the equilibrium of the
market.
Comforting statements, wishful thinking, and deceptive drafting
obscured the expansive impact of these anti-circumvention
provisions." The act purports to not alter any existing defenses to
copyright infringement; § 1201(c) provides that, "nothing in this
section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title." While it
may be true that defenses to copyright infringement are not altered, a
violation of § 1201 is not an infringement of a copyright. Therefore,
defenses to copyright infringement probably do not apply to § 1201
claims.
Consider the availability of the equitable defense of fair use. The
statute could have expressly provided for the fair use defense by
requiring an underlying copyright infringement. Alternatively, the
statute could have provided that no liability would arise when a lock
was circumvented for the purpose of engaging in a fair use activity.
Instead, the statute is at best ambiguous, and at worst silent, on the
availability of the fair use defense for § 1201 claims.83

76. The DMCA conspicuously fails to define the term 'technological measure'. See,
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (b) (Supp. IV 1998).
77. Id. at § 1201(a)(1).
78. Id. at § 1201(a)-(b).
79. Section 1201(a) prohibits the circumvention of a measure that controls access "to
a work protected under this title" and § 1201(b) prohibits the manufacture of a device that
can be used to circumvent a copy control that "effectively protects a right of the copyright
owner under this title."
80. See Benkler, supra n. 21, at 420.
81. Samuelson, supra n. 72, at 536.
82. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (court grants preliminary injunction and notes that the fair use defense is not
available because there is no claim of copyright infringement in the § 1201 action).
83. The only place where the term "fair use" appears is 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c).
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The legislative history on the subject is not much help; most of it
reads like a ruse. Representative Bliley stated the DMCA contains a
"strong fair use provision to ensure that consumers as well as libraries
and institutions of higher learning will be able to continue to exercise
their historical fair use rights."" It is not clear which statutory
provision he is referencing; the only mention of 'fair use' in reference
to the anti-circumvention provisions is in § 1201(c), the above quoted
savings clause. Representative Bliley continues:
The Committee considered it particularly important to ensure that
the concept of fair use would remain firmly established in the law.
Section 1201(a)(1) is one of the most important provisions of this
legislation .... It was crafted by the Commerce Committee to
protect "fair use" and other users of information now lawful under
the Copyright Act.
Representative Bliley's intent seems clear; unfortunately the text
of the DMCA does not reflect Representative Bliley's intent.
Representative Boucher's approach is also of little help. He opined:
The Administration had considered originally... no specific
provision on fair use, since Section 107 of the Copyright Act would,
of course, continue to exist after enactment of the legislation ....
As it was introduced, H.R. 2281 contained two important
safeguards for fair use. First, the bill dealt separately with
technological measures that prevent access and technological
measures that prevent copying. As to the latter, the bill contained
no prohibition on the act of circumvention itself, leaving users free
to circumvent such measures in order to make fair use copies.
Second, the savings clause in subsection 1201(d) ensures that
defenses to copyright protection, including
fair use, are unaffected
86
by the prohibitions on circumvention.
Representative Boucher's approach is entirely disingenuous.
While it is true that an individual is not prohibited from
circumventing technical measures that control copying, an individual
doing so must first gain access to the work. The act of circumventing a
measure that controls access to a work for the sake of engaging in a
fair use is still prohibited.
Senator Ashcroft offered, "[i]n my opinion, this bill achieves a
fair balance by taking steps to effectively deter piracy, while still
allowing fair use of protected materials. ''87 The legislative history
makes it apparent that Congress was concerned with fair use; yet their
intent is not clearly reflected in the statute. Were the drafters
concerned that fair use be preserved? Were they concerned that it
84.
85.
86.
87.

144 Cong. Rec. H7093 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
Id. at H7094.
144 Cong. Rec. H7097 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
144 Cong. Rec. S4891 (daily ed. May 14,1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
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might be preserved to the chagrin of the industry? Were they worried
about opposition to the bill if it was apparent that fair use was being
whittled away?
If the defense of fair use is not available for a § 1201 claim, then
other defenses to copyright infringement, such as copyright misuse,
are also likely to be unavailable. Thus, equitable doctrines that help
the courts maintain the balance of copyright policy by allowing
activities that result in competition and innovation are essentially
made unavailable by the DMCA.
The DMCA does provide some narrow exemptions from the
general prohibition on circumvention.8 Section 1201(f) purports to
allow for reverse engineering of access controls, but this exemption is
hollow for several reasons.89 First, the exemption is too narrow
because it does not allow reverse engineering for the production of
non-infringing works that are not designed to be inter-operative.'
Second, § 1201(b) effectively eclipses the exemption because the
practice of reverse engineering requires devices that are primarily
designed to circumvent. Section 1201(f)(2) of the exemption does
allow individuals who engage in reverse engineering to develop a
"technological means" to circumvent access controls, but the
exemption does not provide the right to distribute devices used for
circumvention of copy controls.91 Furthermore, the language of the
exemption requires that the circumvention be for the "sole purpose"

88. See Samuelson, supra n. 72, at 548-549 (noting the odd construction of
exemptions).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
90. Section 1201 prohibits acts that are considered fair use under Sega and Connectix.
Even under the most limiting interpretation of these holdings, circumventing copy controls

and reverse engineering is considered a fair use if it remains the only viable means of
gaining access in order to design a non-infringing work. The dicta of Sega and Connectix

suggest that the intent of reverse engineering must be to design an interoperable program,
however, the goal of interoperability should not be relevant. What is important is whether
or not the end product infringes. Copyright law does not protect ideas; copyright law
protects expression. Copyright owners are only entitled to exclude competitors who copy
their protected expression; they are not entitled to use the copyrights to exclude
competitors who use their unprotectable ideas. Interoperability is not a test for

determining whether the competitor appropriated ideas or expressions. Through reverse
engineering a competitor might design a program that is not interoperable, which does not
incorporate any of the protectable expression of the original work. Likewise, a competitor
might develop an interoperable program that consists of so much protectable expression

that it constitutes an infringing derivative work.
91.

Presumably, the "technical means" in § 1201(f)(2) is the same thing as a

"technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof" found in § 1201(a)(2)
and (b). This presumption is made because it is difficult to imagine what the difference
would be considering that both terms are extremely broad.
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of analyzing elements necessary for achieving interoperability.' Few
useful reverse engineering tools could ever meet this standard
because they often serve more than one function, and if they can be
used to circumvent access controls, they may be able to be used to
circumvent copy controls as well.93 Despite the § 1201(f) exemption,
§ 1201(b) will effectively destroy the legal market for these
technological means of circumvention. Scientists will have to reinvent
the wheel every time they attempt to reverse engineer a work. The
exemption in § 1201(f)(2) is thus difficult to use and inefficient.
The DMCA also does not provide any exemptions for
circumventing technological protection systems for the purpose of
engaging in parody, criticism, or news reporting.' In addition to these
fair uses, there are many other possible fair uses and innovative
activities for which the DMCA does not provide exemptions.
Essentially, the statute does not provide many viable defenses.
The anti-circumvention provisions can, and will, be used to block
competition and the introduction of new technologies. The DMCA
protects locks that were developed for and are primarily used to
exclude unauthorized third parties from reverse engineering the
owner's product.9 Most § 1201 claims will not be raised against
hackers or those intending to make infringing products; most § 1201
claims will be levied against competitors, including competitors
making non-infringing products.
B.

Copyright Policy Takes a Wrong Turn

Copyright policy is made available and governed by a
constitutional mandate.96 As the Supreme Court has held, "[t]he
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'

97

Copyright

is designed to promote innovation. All other policy goals are
secondary.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
93. See generally, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (order granting preliminary injunction and narrowly interpreting the reverse
engineering exemption, by relying on the statute's "sole purpose" language).
94. Samuelson, supra n. 88.
95. See Julie Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1094
(1995) (arguing that before the advent of the DMCA, reverse engineering was the reason
lock-out programs were developed.)
96. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl.
8.
97. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991).
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Professor Julie Cohen describes the DMCA as a "radical
departure from existing copyright law. 98 The departure is so radical
that it may not even be a "copyright" law. When enacting this
legislation, the drafters treated it as a copyright act. It is included in
title 17 and "amends" the Copyright Act of 1976 by adding "a new
chapter to U.S. copyright law." 99 The legislation is even titled the
"Digital Millennium Copyright Act." However, as Representative
Bliley put it, the DMCA creates "entirely new rights for content
providers that are wholly divorced from copyright law."' ° Since the
defenses to copyright infringement that are made available to
infringement claims by the rest of the Copyright Act are not
available, it may be proper to assume that the DMCA is not actually
part of the Copyright Act. The DMCA is not linked to infringement
and, as discussed below, it runs counter to the "purpose" requirement
of the Copyright and Patent clause by actually retarding progress and
innovation.
Professor Mark Lemley argues that "the primary purpose of the
DMCA is to intervene in the innovation marketplace, by imposing
what one might call 'unilateral technological disarmament' on
designers of encryption-breaking systems."' °' In the field of
encryption, innovation is effectively outlawed. The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA specifically prohibit
decryption. 2 Additionally, § 1201(b) freezes the market for
decryption technology by prohibiting the manufacture or traffic in
technologies designed to circumvent copy controls. 3 This, of course,
occurs only within the United States. There is no reason to assume
that the rest of the world is going to unilaterally terminate all
encryption research. These provisions cripple the American industry
for encryption research.
Innovation is further damaged because of the direct reduction in
access that results from the DMCA.' Knowledge is cumulative;

98. Julie Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161,172 (1997).
99. 144 Cong. Rec. S4886 (daily ed., May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
100. 144 Cong. Rec. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
101. Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for
ElectronicCommerce, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 745, 749 (1999).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(C)(3).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)
104. Julie Cohen has repeatedly advocated for the conceptualization of an affirmative
right of access to information. See, e.g., Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of the
Internet,8 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 693, 701 (1998); see also Patry, supra n. 4.
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creative works build on previous creative works." However, the
DMCA protects mechanisms that are designed to prevent access to
knowledge.
Furthermore, the protection afforded these technological locks
can be used in a number of inappropriate ways. First, an individual
can simultaneously place a lock over a copyrighted work and a work
that is not capable of copyright protection, thus extending the power
to exclude over works that existing copyright law does not protect.
Second, technological protection systems can be used to hide other
copyright or patent infringements. Circumventing these technological
mechanisms to police other copyright and patent rights is not
expressly allowed under the DMCA. Finally, when combined with
contracts, technological protection systems can be used to prohibit
creative uses of the work, such as parody, criticism, news-reporting,
and reverse engineering.' The DMCA will result in legally protected
de facto monopolies over functional aspects of computer programs,
ideas, and materials that were formerly in the public domain."°
C. The DMCA Encourages Misuse

The DMCA stifles innovation by creating an incentive to engage
in the monopolistic practices of misuse." The DMCA creates an
incentive to engage in copyright misuse regardless of whether the use
of a technological protection system to prevent access to public
domain material is considered a misuse. Prior to the DMCA, the
availability of the copyright misuse defense and fair use defense
provided the copyright owner reasons to avoid engaging in a misuse;
protection by the copyright law was conditioned upon not engaging in
misuses. After the DMCA a copyright owner has every reason to
actively pursue a policy of copyright misuse." Breach of contract
claims and § 1201 claims are not barred by engaging in activities that

105. See Reichman and Uhlir supran. 8, at 813.
106. See supra text accompanying nn. 20-21.
107. The Supreme Court has held that, as a constitutional matter, patents may not
remove existent knowledge from the public domain. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989). See discussion infra Part III.D.
108. Interestingly, the DMCA provides incentive for the industry to engage in both
copyright and patent misuse. The interplay between the DMCA and patent law has not
yet been explored in the legal literature and is beyond the scope of this comment.
109. The battle over Java demonstrates the ingenuity corporations will utilize in order
to ensure that interoperability will not occur if that interoperability occurs at the risk of
market competition. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14
(D.D.C. 1999).

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.

constitute a misuse of the copyright monopoly."' The owner loses

nothing by engaging in behavior that contravenes public policy.
Nevertheless, the inquiry into when the practice of using a
technological lock constitutes copyright misuse remains worthy of
pursuit. Lasercomb established that a contract that extends a
copyright by preventing others from creating innovative works or
effectively extends the term of the copyright beyond the term
provided in the statute can alone constitute a misuse." Can using a
technological protection system by itself constitute copyright
misuse?" 2 Computer programs always have at least a portion of
functional code that is fundamentally unprotectable, but owners of
copyrighted software do have interests that deserve protection. In
fact, it seems that the law encourages a healthy amount of self-help."3
The use of a technological protection system, by itself, is probably not
a misuse. However, it may be copyright misuse to use the lock to
extend monopoly power over knowledge clearly in the public
domain."' Furthermore, it may also be copyright misuse to use a
legally protected technological protection system in combination with
a license to stymie competition.
Consider the options available to a potential market entrant who
desires to pursue a fair use activity. Prior to the DMCA, the copyright
owner relied on the protection of private contract coupled with a
technological lock. The market entrant had a choice of (1) agreeing to
contract provisions that, in all likelihood, prohibited the desired fair
use and then risking contract liability by breaching the agreement and
engaging in the fair use anyway or (2) circumventing the
technological lock and then risking copyright liability. Assuming that
the market entrant wanted to engage in a fair use of the work, the
market entrant would choose the second option and rely on equitable
defenses such as copyright misuse or fair use if sued. This approach
was followed by Accolade in the Sega case."'
After the DMCA, the second option is foreclosed. If written
110. A possible answer to this dilemma may be to expand the copyright misuse
defense to bar contract claims.
111. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972,977-979.
112. See Julie Cohen, supra n. 95, at 1195-1198 (arguing that lock-out programs alone
should not constitute copyright misuse).
113. See Compuserve v. Cyber Promotions,962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio, 1997).
114. For example, simultaneously placing a technological lock over a protectable
JPEG image and an unprotectable JPEG image. It is much easier to identify where the
protectable material begins and where it ends. With a single piece of software, the inquiry
is inextricable.
115. 977 F.2d at 1517-18.
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today, the Sega decision would likely come out differently. The
copyright owner would sue the market entrant under § 1201(a)(1) for
circumventing an access restriction, § 1201(a)(2) for manufacturing
the device which was used to reverse engineer the console, and §
1201(b) for manufacturing the device which was used to circumvent
the technological system which protect the copyrights in the console.
Accolade, relying on § 1201(f), is likely to prevail on the § 1201(a)
claims, but lose on the § 1201(b) claim.
Section 1201(a)(1) and (2) prohibit the circumvention of access
controls and the manufacturing of devices designed to circumvent
access controls, but Accolade's activities are likely to be exempt
under § 1201(f). However, § 1201(f) does not allow the development
of a technological means to circumvent a system that protects the
rights of a copyright owner. Manufacturing devices that circumvent
copy controls is prohibited by § 1201(b) and Accolade's activities are
not exempt from § 1201(b) claims by virtue of § 1201(f). In order to
reverse engineer Sega's console, Accolade manufactures a device that
bypasses a technological protection measure. If the technological
measure that is bypassed by Accolade's device serves both as an
access control and as a copy control, then Accolade will violate §
1201(b).
Section 1201(b)(1) prohibits the manufacture of any technology
or device that circumvents a technological measure that "effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title ...

,"6

Section

1201(b)(2)(B) explains that "a technological measure 'effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title' if the measure,
in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or
otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this
title." '17 The rights of a copyright owner under this title are expressly
provided in §107 of the Copyright Act. " ' One of the enumerated
exclusive rights is the right of reproduction."9 All technological
protection measures, at some level, prevent others from reproducing
the underlying work. Copies of the underlying work cannot be made
if access to the code is not available. Therefore, whether the
mechanism is an "access control" or a "copy control" is effectively
irrelevant under the plain meaning of the statute.
There is no reason to assume that the technological measure

116.
117.
118.
119.

17 U.S.C.A § 1201(b)(1)(a).
Id. at § 1201(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 107.
Id.
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cannot serve two purposes, preventing unauthorized access and
protecting the reproduction right or derivative work right. Even
assuming that all devices can be classified as either prohibiting
unauthorized access or protecting a copyright owner's rights, how can
one tell the difference between a device that controls access and a
device that protects the rights of a copyright owner? 12 Moreover,
Sega could simply add a technological device that is clearly designed
to impede reverse engineering by controlling the ability to copy the
program. Accolade would thus violate the DMCA if they
manufactured a circumvention device in order to engage in reverse
engineering. Therefore, Accolade's creative, innovative, and
competitive activities are prohibited by the DMCA. Accolade's only
alternative would be to not engage in circumvention or reverse
engineering.12 The result is that competition is stifled and new
innovative works are not produced.
This outcome is not a stretch of the imagination. Consider the
outcome of a recent preliminary injunction hearing regarding DVD
protection measures. Defendants had distributed an algorithm that
circumvented the digital encryption measures used to prevent DVD
viewing on unauthorized platforms. Specifically, defendant's software
application made plaintiff's copyrighted digital works compatible with
the Linux platform. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, the
district court granted owners of copyrights in DVD movies a
preliminary injunction against defendants.' Unlike the courts in Sega
and Connectix, this court saw little value in interoperability. This case
illustrates how the DMCA can be used by owners of copyrights in
DVD movies to extend their copyright monopoly in digital movies
over the market for platforms. These owners are gaining patent-like
protection in the platform; they are given the de facto right to grant

120. Some copyright controls prevent access to copying functions. See Steffik, supra
n. 19.
121. The relationship between fair use and the language of § 1201(b) regarding "a
right protected under this title" is unclear. One may argue that a technological protection
measure does not protect a "right protected under this title" to the extent that copyright

owners do not have an exclusive right to prohibit fair uses. This position is strengthened if
engaging in fair uses is considered a user's right. The counter position holds that fair use is
only an affirmative defense assessed after the determination of an infringement of an

express copyright. Ultimately, this unsettled argument results in a chilling effect; would-be
competitors will not risk a failing fair use defense, much less a fair use defense failing in
the context of a § 1201 dispute.
122. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (order granting preliminary injunction). N. that this is a not a § 1201(b) claim, but
rather a § 1201(a)(2) claim wherein the court found it likely that the defendant's activities
fell outside the § 1201(f) exemption. Id. at 217-18.
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licenses in something they do not own, despite the express statutory
and constitutional limits of their monopoly.
D. The Unconstitutionality of the DMCA

Congress does not have a general power to pass laws; the
Constitution must first authorize Congress to act.'23 Every act of
Congress is a hat that must find an appropriate Constitutional hook.
When enacting the Copyright act, Congress used Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, of the Constitution as a hook. As already noted, this portion
of the Constitution contains a "purpose" requirement. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 does not justify the anti-circumvention provisions
of the DMCA. The provisions are not only outside the scope of the
Copyright and Patent clause, but also run counter to the
constitutionally required "urpose." The DMCA outlaws certain
technological innovations, stunting the growth of encryption sciences.
Furthermore, it makes unavailable defenses traditionally used to
balance copyright policy, and results in misuse and de facto
monopolies over functional aspects of computer programs. The
DMCA does meet the hopes of the industry, but it does not meet the
requirements of the Constitution.
The DMCA creates new rights that directly and immediately
protect technological mechanisms without any requirement of
originality in the mechanism itself.'24 The kind of rights that are
created by the anti-circumvention provisions are not copyrights
afforded authors of original writings, but rather, are more like
property rights based on effort and "sweat of the brow." They are
rights based on the decision to use a technological mechanism.
Section 1201(a) of the DMCA states that "no person shall circumvent
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title."'25 This extends protection to technological
measures, not to copyrighted materials, and goes beyond the scope of
the 'purpose' requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. Section
1201(b) of the DMCA likewise prohibits the development of any
technological measure which "effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title.' 26 This section actually curtails the
development of the arts and sciences under the guise of protecting the
rights of copyright owners, once again going beyond the scope of
123.
U.S. 82,
124.
125.

This is an indisputable constitutional principle. See The Trademark Cases, 100
93 (1879).
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).

126. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. The anti-circumvention provisions are
not designed to promote innovation; they are designed to prevent
others from reaping where they have not sown.
This kind of congressional approach has been invalidated before.
In The Trademark Cases, the Supreme Court invalidated a trademark
law that was premised on the Copyright and Patent clause, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8. 17 The Court held that trademark laws, premised
on the Copyright and Patent clause are invalid because they have no
necessary relation to innovation."' Likewise, the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA, premised on the Copyright and Patent
clause, are invalid because the provisions are not related to
promoting progress in the arts and sciences.
The DMCA removes, or enables the removal of, material from
the public domain. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court wrote that, "Congress may
not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it
'authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available."' 2" If Congress may not use patent law
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, Congress
should not be allowed to achieve the same result by using copyright
law. Copyright law has the same constitutional limitations as patent
law. The DMCA anti-circumvention provisions violate the
constitution by authorizing the removal of public domain knowledge.
Supporters of the DMCA might turn to the Necessary and
Proper clause for constitutional support of the anti-circumvention
measures DMCA. " ° However, the Necessary and Proper clause of the
Constitution cannot save the anti-circumvention provisions from their
constitutional infirmities. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides
a liberal standard for review; the test is "reasonableness". 31 However,
the allegedly "reasonable" legislative activity must be in pursuit of
another express grant of power. The Necessary and Proper Clause
defines the congressional scope of power after a constitutional grant
of power has been located within the Constitution. The DMCA does
not pursue the express grant found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.
127. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
128. Id. at 94.
129. 489 U.S. 141,146 (1989) (quoting Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
130. See Universal City Studios, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (order granting
preliminary injunction).
131. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Burlington Northern
R. Co. v. Woods, 180 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
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The DMCA is a legislative hat without a constitutional hook. The
Copyright and Patent Clause is not related to the policy that the
DMCA pursues, and it cannot provide the needed grant of power to
support the DMCA.132

IV
Conclusion
In addition to the unconstitutionality of the anti-circumvention
measures of the DMCA, these measures are anti-competitive and
reflect poor policy making. Limited legal monopolies on knowledge
will become unlimited de facto monopolies. Competition and
innovation are damaged by the approach taken by the DMCA and
the economic justification of copyright law is destroyed. The historical
intent of copyright law as well as the traditional defenses to copyright
infringement claims have been set aside entirely by the DMCA. If the
DMCA anti-circumvention measures are maintained as drafted, the
balance of copyright law will be unwisely rendered askew.

132. Nor can the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions be justified by the Commerce
Clause. The argument is not ripe because the DMCA is not an act of congressional power
based on the Commerce Clause; the statute amends the copyright code. Furthermore, the
Commerce Clause cannot override express limitations found in other portions of the
Constitution. See Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at
the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First
Amendment, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 47, 56 (1999) (arguing that extending protection
to databases cannot appropriately be based on the Commerce Clause).
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